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Abstract. Climate change adaptation is largely a local matter, and adaptation 
planning can benefit from local climate change projections. Such projections are 
typically generated by accepting climate model outputs in a relatively uncritical 
way. We argue, based on the IPCC’s treatment of model outputs from the CMIP5 
ensemble, that this approach is unwarranted and that subjective expert judgment 
should play a central role in the provision of local climate change projections 
intended to support decision-making. 
 
1. Introduction. It is now widely accepted that global warming is real and in large 
part due to human activities.1 But the big picture of increasing global average 
temperature reveals few specifics about how climate change will impact human lives 
and natural ecosystems at a local scale. Regional climates are changing, and will 
continue to change, in their own unique ways. Residents of one region may 
experience more summer droughts, while others on the same continent experience 
fewer. One city may face higher storm surges, another, more severe heat waves, a 
third, reduced monsoon rains.  
To some degree, we can adapt to these changes by aligning our behavior, 
institutions, and infrastructure with the new reality. Farmers can plant different crops; 
foresters can adjust their management plans; a water company can add a new reservoir; 
a city might strengthen its flood protection; centers for disease control can prepare for 
migrating vectors; city heath departments can build cooling centers for vulnerable 
residents; insurers (and reinsurers) can recalculate their prices. 
Adapting, however, requires insight into where the local climate is headed. Is it 
                                                
1 The evidence is presented in the most recent IPCC report (Stocker et al. 2013); the consensus is 
documented in Oreskes (2007).  
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worth investing in a new irrigation system? That depends on whether recent dry 
conditions are the new normal or just a streak of bad luck. Longer-term plans that are 
expensive to change once implemented would better be informed by projections further 
into the future. Construction of Britain’s new high-speed train infrastructure, for 
instance, is set to begin in 2017. We would like to design the tunnels to avoid 
overheating during late twenty first century summers, projected to be warmer and drier 
than today’s and with more intense hot weather events (High Speed Two Limited, 2013). 
Several coastal sites in the UK are currently being evaluated for new build nuclear 
power stations; the choice of site, as well as the physical design and adaptive 
management plan are sensitive to long term projections of local sea level rise (Wilby et 
al. 2011). And similar questions arise, of course, in other parts of the world.  
Our topic is how climate science can best inform these local adaptation decisions. 
We begin by reviewing a standard approach to local climate change projections (Section 
2) and considering some reasons for caution (Section 3). An alternative emerges from a 
sideward look at how scientific knowledge has been incorporated into decisions on 
issues such as dam safety and regulation of toxic substances. The key idea is to 
introduce a process of structured expert elicitation (Section 4). We discuss specific 
issues that may arise in implementing such a procedure for local climate change 
adaptation decisions (Section 5) and then draw some conclusions (Section 6).  
 
2. Answers Offered. Science-based information and advice that aims to inform local 
adaptation decisions goes by the general name climate services. The goods on offer 
include data sets and climate forecasts (sometimes called products) as well as guidance 
on how to approach and think about adaptation planning (decision support). A variety of 
organizations currently develop and deliver climate services, including private 
consultancies, NGOs, universities, and government agencies.2 
While climate services products vary in what exactly they offer and in how the 
offerings are presented, the methodology behind them is, in broad strokes, often the 
same: Start with output from general circulation models (GCMs), which simulate the 
whole climate system at a coarse resolution; then use one or more downscaling methods, 
which interpolate the GCM output to give finer details over the region of interest; 
                                                
2  For a brief overview of the state of climate services in the United States, see the American 
Meteorological Society's (2015) policy statement on climate services. 
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finally, downscaled projections may be combined with local historical data. Methods 
diverge in their selection of GCMs and approach to downscaling, and in how they 
manage and communicate the uncertainties that pile up along the way.  
An example of such a product offered by a government agency is The United 
Kingdom Climate Impacts Program’s UKCP09 project. The project offers a set of 
quantitative projections for local variables such as the change in temperature of the 
warmest summer day in London or the change in total precipitation during the wettest 
winter season in Tewkesbury.3 These projections, at the scale of a 25km grid, can be 
directly accessed on UKCP09’s website in the form of probabilities for different 
timescales (2020s/2050s/2080s) and alternative emissions scenarios (high/medium/low). 
The projections are advertised as relevant for practical decision support, and “worked 
examples” show how they should be used to tackle concrete problems such as energy 
use and sustainability in school buildings, overheating risk for buildings and flood 
management policy (Met Office, 2009). 
Projects of this kind are not restricted to the UK. A larger project called 
weADAPT provides small-scale information based on the CMIP5 archive4 of GCM 
runs at particular station locations and using a statistical downscaling method. The 
weADAPT portal describes some in-depth case studies for use and interpretation of the 
data. For example, one case study looks at Bagamoyo, Tanzania, and offers an answer 
to the question: “What do current trends in temperatures, rainfall and mean sea level, 
and medium- and long-term projections, suggest are the most serious climate risks that 
government officials in Bagamoyo district need to address?” (Besa 2013). Cal-Adapt 
offers adaptation information for California, Climate Wizard for the entire USA, 
Climate Impacts Online for Germany, and the list could go on.5 An ever-increasing 
number of private consultancies also offer similar climate change products, usually 
based on publicly available data.6 
                                                
3 “UKCP” stands for United Kingdom Climate Projections and “09” indicates that it was launched for 
public use in 2009. 
4 CMIP5 is the fifth instantiation of the internationally coordinated Coupled Model Intercomparison 
Project, which compares the results of different GCMs.  
5 For information see, respectively, California Energy Commission (2016), The Nature Conservancy 
(2009), and ClimateImpactsOnline (2012). 
6 An example is JBA Consulting, North Yorkshire, UK. 
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In sum, questions about future local climate are, today, mostly answered by 
using state-of-the-art GCMs combined with downscaling.  
 
3. Do the Answers Provide Actionable Information? Its popularity notwithstanding, 
this method has questionable credentials as a provider of actionable local information. 
This conclusion can be reached from at least three different directions. We comment 
only briefly on the first two: detailed analysis of individual projects, and recognition of 
actual predictive failures. Our main focus here is a third path to the same conclusion: 
making explicit the implications of the most recent report from the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  
Each climate projection project is based on a set of methodological assumptions, 
and these can be subjected to scrutiny. Frigg, Smith and Stainforth (2013, 2015) analyze 
the foundational assumptions of UKCP09 and argue that the methods used do not 
warrant treating model outputs as decision relevant projections. Similar in-depth 
analyses could be carried out for other projects. Needless to say, we can only speculate 
about the outcomes of such an exercise, but given the arguments we present below we 
would not expect the verdicts on other projects to differ significantly.  
Regarding the success of predictions, Mearns (2014) reports telling results from 
a study evaluating models for the purpose of predicting the future regional climate of 
North America. Mearns and colleagues compared a number of variations on the 
methodology described above, in each instance combining one of four GCMs with one 
of six regional climate models (simulation-based downscaling methods). They 
evaluated each model pair by comparing its simulation of 1980-2005 with the weather 
data of that period. Two such model evaluation exercises focused on (1) the North 
American Monsoon in Southwest US and Northern Mexico, and (2) summer 
precipitation in the Northeast. A surprising result was that the model pair that performed 
best on (1) performed worst on (2); and few model pairs performed respectably on both.  
The result suggests that local climate projections are more sensitive to the choice 
of models than previously supposed. The problem is compounded by the difficulty of 
identifying any factor (or set of factors) in the models that explains the differences in 
performance. Furthermore, past success is not necessarily a guide to future success 
(Reifen and Toumi 2009), making it difficult to learn from a model’s success in 
reproducing past data. This suggests that interpreting regional model outputs as decision 
relevant projections is more problematic than previously assumed. In particular, it raises 
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doubts about using any single model, or even the same ensemble or ensemble-weighting, 
for general-purpose national climate projections where multiple regions, variables and 
timescales are of interest.   
Our main argument, however, is based on the most recent IPCC report.7 The 
report includes global mean temperature projections for 2100 with a clear assessment of 
their reliability. They give, for instance, a projection of 2.6-4.8°C of global mean 
temperature rise relative to the late twentieth century, supposing the RCP8.5 scenario, 
which describes an illustrative “possible future” in which greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to rise unabated. The IPCC quantifies uncertainty in a projection using 
standardized language referring to likelihood intervals, for example, “virtually certain” 
(> 99%), “very likely” (> 90%), or “more likely than not” (> 50%) (Stocker et al. (2013), 
Box TS.1, Technical Summary). The 2.6-4.8°C projection is qualified as “likely,” which 
means there is a 66-100% chance of the real-world outcome falling into that range, 
given the scenario.  
The range 2.6-4.8°C is arrived at by looking at the CMIP5 ensemble of climate 
models: a set of state-of-the-art models that have each run the RCP8.5 scenario and 
supplied a value for the projected temperature change at 2100. This set of single values 
is then used to fit the parameters (mean and standard deviation) of a Gaussian 
probability distribution. The range 2.6-4.8°C is the interval which symmetrically spans 
90% of that distribution. In the “model-world,” therefore, this range is an estimate of the 
interval into which model runs chosen from some underlying distribution will fall 90% 
of the time. In IPCC terminology this interval would be referred to as a “very likely” 
range. 
The IPCC authors’ next step is to note that even state-of-the-art climate models 
share systematic biases (Knutti et al 2010). All models are limited by the same 
computational constraints; they are based on the same limited set of parameterizations; 
and they are calibrated to reproduce features of twentieth-century climate which may be 
less relevant for twenty-first century developments. For these reasons, when translating 
model-world findings into real-world projections, the IPCC authors downgrade the 
model-derived “very likely” uncertainty quantification for the range 2.6-4.8°C to 
“likely.” Thus while there is a >90% probability that a state-of the-art model run will 
                                                
7 Our discussion is based on Stocker et al. (2013), Sections 12.2.3 and 12.4.1, and Summary for 
Policymakers Table SPM.2 (see notes c and d). 
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result in a temperature change between 2.6-4.8 degrees, there is only a >66% chance—
in the authors’ judgment—that the real climate system will produce this outcome. So the 
IPCC judge that there is a up to an additional 24% probability that the actual climate 
outcome (for the RCP8.5 scenario) will be outside the central range of the models and 
that we experience something entirely different than what the models suggest. This is a 
clear indication that climate scientists do not believe the raw outputs of model 
ensembles to represent real-world probability distributions.  
The reassignment of probabilities described above is based on an informal 
process of expert judgment: the discussions and iterations between authors during the 
long writing and review stages of the report. We commend the forthrightness with 
which the IPCC acknowledges the role of expert judgment in their assessment process. 
At the same time, we recognize some drawbacks to the (relatively unstructured) way in 
which they go about it (details below). The main conclusion we draw from the example 
is that the IPCC’s own results and methods contain the assertion that there is significant 
uncertainty about climate projections, and that this uncertainty is best quantified by 
appeal to expert opinion. 
This conclusion should not be limited to global mean temperature. Indeed, 
global mean temperature is the variable in which there is (rightly) the most confidence 
about climate models’ ability to represent relevant processes.8 So for the local-scale 
variables that matter to adaptation planners, we would expect to see a probability 
downgrade of at least the same magnitude as the one given for global mean temperature. 
In effect the 24% represents an imprecise lower bound to our uncertainty about other 
variables.9 The conclusion we draw from this is that the case for quantifying uncertainty 
through expert judgment is even stronger when it comes to local-scale variables, and 
that uncertainty in local climate projections should be assessed through a suitably 
structured process of expert elicitation. This conclusion stands in stark contrast with 
                                                
8 See for example Stocker et al. (2013), Technical Summary, page 81: “Model agreement and 
confidence in projections depends on the variable and on spatial and temporal averaging, with better 
agreement for larger scales. Confidence is higher for temperature than for those quantities related to the 
water cycle or atmospheric circulation.” 
9 In passing we note that levels of uncertainty are not expected to decrease significantly in the short and 
medium term, ever-increasing computational resources notwithstanding (Maslin and Austin 2012; 
Knutti and Sedlacek 2013).  
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current practice, where model results are often interpreted directly as a probability 
distribution of future real-world climate outcomes (this happens, for instance, in 
UKCP09).  
 
4. Lateral Knowledge Transfer. The climate services sector faces a situation in which 
decisions call for scientific input, but there is severe uncertainty about the modeling on 
which scientists can rest their advice. Climate change adaptation, however, is not the 
only field that satisfies this description. Indeed the situation is comparable in many 
policy-relevant areas of science and engineering, for example toxicology, public health, 
and nuclear safety. To illustrate what has become a standard approach to the problem, 
we now have a look at a concrete case in environmental regulation. Our claim is that the 
example will illustrate important lessons for climate services.  
Zoning plans for sites that use or manufacture large volumes of toxic substances 
typically include a buffer zone in which no housing development can occur. How large 
should the buffer zone be? A political process can determine the acceptable level of risk 
for residents of neighboring developments, but what distance limits the risk to this 
level? The Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment of the Netherlands 
sponsored a study to help answer this question for a handful of common industrial 
chemicals including chlorine, ammonia and hydrogen chloride (Goossens et al. 1998).  
The key uncertainties concerned quantities for which there are no direct 
empirical observations: concentrations and exposure times that are fatal for humans. 
The standard approach to estimating those quantities models human toxicology using 
data from animal studies, treating the laboratory animal as an analogue model for 
humans and extrapolating concentrations and exposure times by adjusting for body 
weight, lung capacity, etc. This modeling exercise delivers answers, but how much can 
they be trusted? Humans are not 70kg rodents, and different species may react through 
different physiological pathways altogether. Indeed, there are competing explanations of 
some chemicals’ toxicity in humans. Moreover, extrapolation results are sensitive to 
debatable scaling assumptions. And of course there are no data against which to test the 
resulting predictions (if there were, these would have already resolved the issue). 
Furthermore, a sole reliance on scale modeling fails to take advantage of other 
relevant sources of knowledge. For many chemicals, there are well-developed, 
qualitative toxicological models that describe metabolic processes, functional changes 
in the impacted organs, and clinical expression of these organ-function disturbances. 
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There may also be quantitative chemical and biological understanding of their “kinetics” 
within the body: rates of absorption, distribution, metabolism, and elimination. This 
knowledge is relevant to estimating the required concentrations and exposure times, and 
to judging the reliability of the extrapolations from animal studies, but there is no 
established quantitative method of feeding everything into a hopper and turning the 
crank for an all-things-considered best estimate. 
To integrate the available evidence into actionable findings, the experimenters 
recruited 27 toxicologists from industry, academia, and government (about five experts 
per chemical). The experts reviewed the available research and provided, through a 
carefully structured interview, their all-things-considered subjective judgments for the 
required concentrations and exposure times. The interview process, or elicitation, draws 
on a large body of research on the formatting and sequencing of questions to reduce 
overconfidence and minimize the effects of cognitive biases. In this particular case, the 
experimenters also developed a set of seed questions (with known answers) to evaluate 
expert competence, and then pooled judgments mathematically, giving experts with 
higher marks on the seed questions greater weight, yielding a single best-estimate dose-
response curve for each chemical. From this, regulatory authorities could derive the 
buffer zone depth that limits the risk of lethal exposure to the safety standard previously 
set. 
The study just described is an example of structured expert elicitation (SEE), a 
family of methods designed to incorporate expert knowledge into risk management and 
strategic and policy decisions. SEE has spread from early applications in defense 
planning and aero-space engineering to wider use in the nuclear sector (Cooke, 2013) 
and in support of regulatory and other policy decisions (Aspinall, 2010; Morgan, 2014) 
especially environmental regulation, food safety, public health, and disaster 
management. There are a variety of methods; some include deliberation between 
experts, others (like the above) elicit judgments separately and then aggregate the 
results, yet others report a full range of opinion, disagreements and all (see Cook and 
Goossens (2000), Goossens et al. (2008) and Martini and Boumans (2014) for wide-
ranging reviews of applications and discussions of the method). 
 
5. Changing Paradigm. In Section 3 we argued that there are severe uncertainties in 
regional climate projection, and that these uncertainties are best assessed via expert 
judgment. Section 4 looked at an analogous case of environmental planning where SEE 
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is used to assess uncertainties and synthesize different sources of knowledge into 
actionable results. Putting these two strands of argument together leads to our core 
suggestion: that all local climate change projections intended to support decision-
making should be produced through a process of SEE.  
To be clear, SEE does not replace modeling exercises on this approach. 
Rather, the suggestion is to quit regarding downscaled GCM outputs as the only (or 
the privileged) source of information, and to use model outputs alongside other 
sources of information. Experts have much to draw on, including physical 
understanding of large-scale processes such as the greenhouse effect, energy 
conservation principles (sometimes violated by model behavior), historical data sets, 
projections based on simple models and statistical methods, and reconstructions of 
climate change in the distant past.  Knowledge about model development is also 
essential, including understanding of the effects of km-scale resolution, of including 
or excluding particular processes (or including them only through ad-hoc 
parameterization), of mathematical idealizations of conceptual relationships, and of 
the numerical approximations required to process the mathematical idealizations. 
Simulations of the recent past have also been statistically compared to corresponding 
observations and plausible reasons for inaccuracies debated. The relative strengths 
and weaknesses of alternative model formulations are continually debated as well. All 
of this knowledge and understanding (and more) can inform expert judgments about 
local-scale climate projections.  
There are many variations in SEE methodology and a large literature on its 
theory and application. If one accepts our proposal, many questions remain about how 
best to implement SEE for climate change projections, including how to pick the experts, 
what constitutes a reasonable quorum of relevant experts, and how best to incentivize 
participation and address conflicts of interest. Other questions concern the mathematical 
formalism used to encode an expert’s judgments (e.g., precise versus imprecise 
probability), and whether the individual judgments are aggregated (Genest and Zidek, 
1986) or presented as a group. Cooke (1991, 2014) and Aspinall (2010), for example, 
promote a version of the former, while Morgan (2014) generally favors the latter. We 
believe no one method is right or wrong in general. The challenge is finding the right 
tool for the job, and this is a task for future research.  
Irrespective of the specifics, there are a few general issues we wish to address. 
One knee-jerk reaction to our proposal may be that results produced with SEE are too 
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subjective to inform evidence-based policy. This is wrong. All climate modeling 
exercises involve subjective decisions that can significantly influence the outcome, from 
the selection of models to include in an ensemble, to the range of parameter 
perturbations and initial conditions explored in a sensitivity analysis, to the method of 
downscaling (not to mention the decisions made in constructing a GCM in the first 
place). By asking experts to assess and communicate the consequences of these 
decisions as best they can, considering all available information, the proposed approach 
is more transparent about the subjectivity, but it is not more subjective. The alternative 
to SEE is not objective calculation; the alternatives are unstructured expert judgment (as 
in the IPCC report), or unstructured non-expert judgment (when model-world results 
are communicated to policy-makers ill-equipped to assess their real-world importance). 
Reliable objective calculation of probabilities based on nonlinear model output has been 
argued elsewhere to be infeasible (Frigg, Bradley, Du, and Smith, 2014). SEE does not 
guarantee trustworthiness, but it can compensate for (some of) the (known) 
inadequacies of climate models. Echoing a notorious remark of Churchill’s about 
democracy, we submit that SEE is the worst form of science advising, except for all 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time. 
Others seem to have reached a similar conclusion and called for the IPCC 
assessment process to incorporate SEE (Reilly et al., 2001; Oppenheimer et al., 2007; 
Shapiro et al., 2010; Yohe and Oppenheimer, 2011). IPCC author teams have so far 
made their collective judgments through an informal procedure that does little to 
address cognitive biases and adverse group dynamics such as deference to high status 
participants. And despite the recent emphasis on “traceable accounts,” the expert 
judgment process is still largely opaque to outsiders. Standard SEE practice requires 
publishing the interview protocols, raw elicitation results (anonymized), and any 
procedures for facilitated deliberation and/or mathematical aggregation along with the 
final results. We support the incorporation of SEE into IPCC process and recommend 
that the same ought to be done in the case of local climate projections. 
Even those who agree in principle with our conclusion might worry that SEE 
will offer no new insights in the case of local climate change projections because the 
outcome is in effect a foregone conclusion. We know, the objection continues, that 
models underestimate uncertainty and so SEE will simply downgrade all probability 
distributions, the only question being by how much. The worry is misguided. First, even 
where the need to downgrade is clear from the start, the degree is not, and the degree 
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matters. Second, this is not the only thing that can happen. In some contexts (weather 
forecasting, for instance) models can overestimate uncertainty and experts will sharpen 
the probability distribution. In other cases uncertainties are asymmetrical and can lead 
to a skewing rather than a widening of the distribution, and in yet other cases the verdict 
could be that the distribution is systematically biased and needs to be “moved.” 
Moreover, SEE need not enter the process only at the end of resource intensive 
modeling projects, but should also inform their aims and methodology earlier on. This 
could constrain the choice of variables, time scales, and spatial scales for which it is 
worth trying to provide decision-relevant model information. Undoubtedly, there are 
some such limits beyond which projections are simply not plausible; arguably, many 
climate services products already exceed those limits. If experts judge large swaths of 
model output useless or misinformative for decision-making, something has gone wrong 
at an earlier stage. 
 
6. Conclusion. For the purpose of local climate change decision support, direct model 
outputs can be misleading. The IPCC’s published expert judgment about modeled 
global mean temperature projections implies that probabilities derived directly from 
model output on smaller-scale variables are inappropriate inputs to decision-making. 
Better models and faster computers cannot by themselves make the problem go away, 
and provision of local climate change projections should instead be reconceptualized as 
a problem of eliciting expert judgment based on a number of sources including but not 
limited to model output. Many open questions remain about how best to implement 
structured expert elicitation for local climate projections. 
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